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· r~scc...vAk...~e · 
9a Until 1957 Mary Jone~ had enjoyed sound health, · but on June 2nd of that year she (j 
went to the hospital su'tfering from abdominal pains. On June 13th, she underwent an ./ 
operation and her su~geon removed a mass growth from her intestines, and Mrs. Jones 
was so informed. Though Mrs. Jones' actual trouble was cancer, that fact was not told 
to her or to her daughter, Alice Brown. The doctor fully realized the seriousness of 
his patient's illness, but hoped to cure her so .that she might reswne a normal life. 
After the operation, Mrs. Jones improved, and on July 1,1957 she was able to leave 
the hospital and return to her home. A week or so later she resumed her normal life 
and was reasonably active for a woman of 53 years of age. She performed all of her 
usual house work, such as washing, cooking and attending to her flowers,etc. 
In June, 1958, S.R.Smith, an insurance agent, went to Mrs.Alice Brown and talked 
with her about a life insurance policy on her mother, Mrs.Jones. Mrs.Brown informed 
the agent about the operation upon her mother for the removal of a growth from her 
intestines. The insurance agent asked Mrs.Brown if her mother's health was good, and 
Mrs. Brown told the agent, 11As far as I know, Mother feels a lot better than I do." 
The agent took out an application for insurance and asked Mrs.Brown nwnerous ques-
tions, which she answered truthfully. After the application was filled out the agent 
asked Mrs .Brown to sign it for her mother, which she did. Mrs. Brown signed her · 
mother's name thereto without reading any of the answers that had been written by 
the agent. The company issued the policy payable to the estate of Mrs.Jones. The 
agent made no attempt to interview Mrs. Jones, and she was never informed that the 
application had been made or that a $1,000 policy was issued. It later turned out 
that as to a material question, an answer had been written that Mrs.Brown did not 
give. The question asked was if insur~d had ever suffered from cancer. The answer 
"No" was there written by the agent. In March, 1959, Mrs.Jones became ill and went 
back to the hospital. She became increasingly worse and died of cancer in April,l959. 
Upon Mrs. Jones' death, her Executor demanded payment of the thousand dollars claimed 
to be due under the policy, but the Company denied liability on the policy on the 
ground that false representations ~nd answers material to the risk had been made in 
the application and hence, the contract of insurance was void. Mrs. Brown comes to 
you and states the above facts, and asks you whether the Company is liable under the 
policy. How would you advise? ,~ ~q 
(INSURANC~) One of these answers should be glven:(l)The Company would be liable.The 
wrong was that of the Company's agent. Mrs.Brown could assume that if she gave correc· 
answers such answers had been put down. So .held in 194 Va.966.The statement that her 
mother was in good health means only that as far as she knows she is in good health, 
or (2)Under V#38.1-330 it is necessary that the individual insured apply for .the 
policy, has knowledge thereof or consents thereto at the time of the making of the 
contract except in the cases of group insurance, insurance between husband and wife, 
and insurance on the life of a minor. Since this statute is one stating Virginia's 
public policy it cannot be avoided by waiver or estoppel. Hence the Company would 
not be liable • 
D 5 c; 
1· Dgring 1954 while happily married, Ruth Rhodes was issued a policy of insurance 
by Sure-Pay Life Insurance Co. insuring the life of her husband Caleb Rhodes. The 
policy provided for the payment of $10,000 to Ruth on the death of Caleb. Thereaftel 
Ruth and Caleb became estranged and in February of 1959 the two were divorced. The 
divorce decree provided for an absolute divorce and extinguished the rights of each 
in the property of the other. In October of 19.59 Caleb died and Ruth, who at all 
times had paid the premiums with her own private funds, tendered the policy to 
Sure-Pay Life Insurance Co. and demanded that it pay her $10,000, The Company deniec 
that it owed Ruth the $10,000, asserting ·that she had no insurable interest in the 
life of Caleb. The Company did, however, tender to her a refund of the $1,482 she 
had previously paid as premiums on the policy. Ruth now asks you whether she may 
recover from Sure-Pay Life Insurance Co. the full of $101 000, or whether she should 
accept the premium refund. What should you advise her? 
{INSURANCE) I would advise her that she was entitle to the whole $10,000. In life 
insurance an insurable interest is required only at the inception of the policy, 
so the policy is valid. The fact that she herself had paid all the premiums gives 
her a still stronger case. Her contract with the insurance company was her propertY. 
and not her husband's, so the divorce decree extinguishing the rights of each in 
the property of the other had no effect on her rights in the policy • 
.5:TB:~aved Spook filed a Motion for Judgment in the Circuit court of Rappahannock 
County against Granite Life Insurance Co, to recover tJte benefits of a life insurance 
policy issued by that company to her husband, Spector Spook. At the trial of the 
case the following facts were proved: 
That Weasel, the local insur&~ce agent for Granite Life Insurance Co., sold a· life 
insurance policy to Spector Spook which named plaintiff as beneficiary; that all 
premiums on said policy had been promptly paid; that before the policy was issued 
Weasel explained to Spector that he would have to file a written appHcation for the 
policy; that the application was filled out by Weas el ; that Spector informed Weasel 
that he had been treated for arteriosclerosis and that he had previously been denied 
life insurance by three other companies; that Weasel wrote the answers to the 
questions on the application blank and falsely stated that Spector had never suffered 
from arteriosclerosis, and that he had never been turned dmm for insurance by any 
other company; that Spector signed the application >-rithout reading it; that a policy 
was i ssued to Spector, to which a .copy of the applicat.ion was attached, and that 
Spector placed the policy in his lock box; and that. Spector never read the policy 
or application prior to his death. After plaintiff c..nnounced t hat she rested her 
case, defendant moved to strike the evidence. How shoul d the C:)ur t rule on the 
motion? (INSURANCE) The motion should be denied. The question states that the facts set forth 
therein were proved. Hence deceased acted in good faith . He could assume that correct 
answers were put down by the agent as long as he had no r eason to suspect the con-
trary. If the insurance company has been defrauded i ·t. was by an act of its own agent, 
and the loss should fall on it ra.ther than on the i nnocent insur€d and his benefi-







6J>t£iss was indebted to Vickers in the sum of $51 000 as a result of a business 
transaction between them. When Bliss was unable to pay this debt, Vickers cancelled 
the obligation out of generosity and his regard for Bliss. Min~ful of Vickers' kind• 
ness to him, Bliss purchased a policy of life insurance on his own life, in the 
face amount of $5 1 000, and named Vickers as beneficiary. He reserved the right to 
change the beneficiary,at any time. Shortly thereafter, Bliss felt another economic 
crisis coming, and he borrowed $1,000 from Bank and assigned the life insurance 
policy as collateral security. Vickers joined in the assignment. 
TTf,lon Bliss' death without having paid B~, the insurance company paid Bank $1,0001 
demand on the administrator of Bliss• estate for pa,_ent to him of $1,000 f'rom the 
estate, but this demand waa 11kewiae refused. 
Vickers seeks your advice and asks you (a)whether he has sufficient legal inte~es~ 
in the policy to entitle him to recover any of its proceeds, and(b)if so, is he en-
titled to recover $1,000 from the estate of Bliss. How would you advise him with 
·;, respect to questions (a) and (b)? . 
..  (INSURANCE) (a) Yes, Vickers has sufficient legal interest in the policy i;.o ~ollect 
· $4,000. The assigment was· to secure a debt or $1,000. Vickers still remained ben~fir 
ciary subject only to the assigment. The law permits anyone who is sui juris to 
make anyone he wishes the beneficiary. The insured has an insurable interest in his 
own life. Since Bliss could have made the insurance payable to his estate and then 
willed it to Bickers there is no reason why he cannot de directly what he could 0.o 
indirectly. If Bliss has that much confidence in Vicker's integrity, the chances o!. 
Vickers killing Bliss to get the insurame are negligible.(b) Yes. Bliss was primari-
ly liable for the $1,000 and Vickers• interest in the policy was security theref'or 
-a suretyship in re. On suretyship principles Vickers would be subrogated to Bank's 
rights against Bliss• estate. See 184 Va.259 on p.2107 of the Insurance Cases in 
these notes. 
5 J' tlbtorist a resident of Roanoke,Ve .• , effected an automobile liabi~ity poli<;Y in 
• iver insurance co. While driving on a trip to Norfolk, he was :Lnvolved ~n a Safe~. "th a car driven by Claimant, who received :Jerious injuries. Motor:Lst was 
coll:LS:LOn Wl ~j~. 
not hurt. The State Trooper investigating the accident told Motorist that the 
phy~ical ·evidence showed conclusively that the accident resulted solely from the 
negligence of Claimant, who was given a traffic summons and forfeited his appearance 
bond. Motorist was so sure that he would hear nothing further from Claimant, and 
t hat the collision was due solely to Claimant's negligence, that he did not report 
the occurrence to his insurance company until he was sued by Claimant almost two 
years after the accident. As soon as suit papers were served on Motorist, he sent 
t hem to the Insurance Company and then learned for the first time that his policy 
cont ained this provision: 
"When an accident occurs, written notice shall be given by or on behalf of the 
insured to the Company as soon as practicable.n 
Insurance Company asks your opinion on the above facts as to its liability for the 
defense of the action and .the pa~ent of any adverse judgment that might be rendered. 
How ought you to advise it? 
(INSURANCE) I would advise that it was not liable. The provision for notice is ao 
important that it goes to the essence of the insurance contract and is an implied 
condition to liability even when not made an express condition. See 189 Va.913 in 
the Insurance Cases in these Notes and 199 Va.221 in accord therewith • 
7. ~~ienry Hopewell worked as an employee of the Fair Furniture Company in Lawrence-
ville, Virginia. In 1959~ during his employment there, Henry became covered by a 
group insurance policy vlhich proviC.ed for termina·~-ion of coverage upon termination 
of employment, but gave the employee the rigbt to convert the policy to an indivi-
dual one within 30 days af ter termination of his employment. 
Henry's emplo;yment at Fair Furniture Company was t enninated on January 30, 1960. 
Under the terms of the above policy, he applied for and obtained an i ndividual 
pol icy, the sta·\Jed effective date of -vrLlch Nas February 1, 1960, naming his w·ife 
as beneficiary. On January 20, 1)61 l:e coJTunttted suicide. The new policy limited 
the Company's lia.bili t y to return of p:cemiun1 i f suicide occurred within one year 
from its effective date. 
Hopewell's wife has sued fo r t he full anon~1t of t he policy, contending that the 
new policy was but a continuation o1 the groUl) i nsurar1ce , and therefore the suicide 
clause did not apply. How ought the court to r-ule? 
(INSURANCE) The court :::hould rule t hat tl-,.e dause doos apply. The inc i vidual poli-
cy is a nevl contract made at a different time and for a different prem.i.1.un. The 
sui cide clause is a usual provision in suc.h policies. 199 Va. 273 on p. 2121 of 
the Insurance cases in these notes. 
7D~1e r.iding as a guest passenger in an automobile owned and operated by his 
brcther-in-law Maverick, Mangle was ser·iously injured when the car struck a telephone 
pole. Maverick reported the accident to Black Hawk Insurance Co., his liability 
carxier, and informed the adjuster that the accident was entirely his fault. The 
company suspected that rviaverick was not telling the truth about how the accident 
occurred, although it had no proof that he was falsifying at that time. The insur-
ance policy contained the customary requirement that the insured cooperate with the 
company in the defense of any action brought against him, and the policy contained 
the further provision that no action should lie against the company unless the insur-
ed had fully complied with all of the terms of the policy. Mangle sued Maverick to 
recover damages for his injuries, and Maverick promptly forwarded the motion for 
judgment to his insurance company. The insurance company advised Maverick that it 
would defend him in the ~ction brought by Mangle, but reserved the right to deny 
liability for the payment of any judgment if it could be later shown that Maverick 
had failed to cooperate with the company as required by the policy. At the trial of 
the case Maverick testified that while driving his car at a speed over 70 miles per 
hour he reached into the back seat to get a bottle of beer and that this caused him 
to strike the pole. A judgment was rendered against Maverick for the sum of $15,000 
in favor of Mangle. 
Shortly after the judgment became final, the insurance co1npany for the first time 
learned that Maverick had withheld from it ti1e names of three witnesses who would 
have testified unequivocally that they saw the accident, and that Maverick was 
driving at a speed of 35 miles per hour, and that Maverick was forced off of the 
road by Banjo who suddenly stepped in front of Maverick's vehicle, causing him to 
swerve from the road. The speed limit was 55 miles per hour. In a later action by 
Mangle against Black Hawk Ins1,1rance Company to recover the amount of the judgment, 
the company denied liability claiming that Maveriek had violated the provj_sion of 
the policy requiring him to cooperate with the company in the defense of the action 
brought against him. Who ohould prevail? 
(INSURANCE) Insurance Company should prevail. There has been a flagrant violation 
..>f the co-operation provision justifying the company in rescinding its contract with 
Maverick. 1nsurance Company has avoid ed a wc:.iver by exprensly reserving its rights. 
Mangle can have no grea-ter rights against the Company tha.n Maverick has for if 
Maverick's policy can be avoided, i"'::.~> avoidance destroys any derivative righse 
Hangl e would otherwise have .. See 199 Va . 908 on p.2122 of the Insun:nco Cases in 





7•1~Jss purchased and paid the premium for an automobile liability insurance policy 
from Insurance Company. One of the provisions of the policy was as follows: 
nThe Insured shall cooperat.e with the company and, upon the company's 
request, shall attend hearings and trials and shall assist in effecting 
settlements, securing and giving evidence, obtaining the attendance of 
witnesses and in the conduc.\i of suits." 
While driving his automobil·e, Moss collided with a n automobile owned and operat-
ed by Prim. Prim instituted an action against Moss for damages, alleging that Moss 
had negligently caused him injuriAs. Insurance Company defended the action under a 
reservation of its rights. The trial resulted in a verdict and judgment for Prim 
in the amount of $11 000. When Insurance Company failed to pay the judgment to Prim, 
and after execution against Mot":s was ret;urned "no effects", Prim instituted an 
action against Insurance Company alleging that he was entitled to recover his judg-
ment against Moss by virtue of Moss• liability policy. At the trial of this action, 
Insurance Company's adjusters testified that they had .first learned of the accident 
from Prj.m two days after it occurred~ that Prim had supplied the names of all 
witnesses, that Moss declined to come to the Company'~ office to advise it how the 
accident occur:tred, and that it ~~as not until the morning of the trial of Prim v. 
Moss that Moss gave the Company his version of how the accident occurred. 
At the conclusion o.f all the evidence Insurance Company, over the objection of 
Prim, requested the court to instruct the jury as follows: 
"If you believe from a preponderance of the evidence that Moss failed to 
cooperate with Insurance Company, even though you may also believe from the 
evidence that such failure to cooperate did not prejudice the company, then 
your verdict sh?uld be for Insurance Company." 
Should the court so instruct the jury? 
(INSURANCE) Yes. Cooperation on material matters is contractual and a. . _ ~ condi-
tion. Hence it is immaterial whether the Company was prejudiced. The Company is also 
privileged to defend under a timely reservation of rights without waiving any of 
its own rights. Creditors of the insured can have no greater rights than the insured • 
Note that this was not a policy of insurance issued to satisfy the provisions of 
the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act in which case the provisions of that 
act would apply. See 189 Va.913. 
6. Father and Son jointly owned an automobile. A policy of liability insurance was 
effected on this automobile, which stated that Father was the sole and unconditional 
owner. There was a provision in the policy which provided that if the ownership of 
the automobile was not sole and unconditional, the insurance should not apply. Son 
loaned the automobile to Friend, who was involved in an accident, in which third 
persons were injured. The Insurance Company consults you and tells you that if it 
had known that Son was a joint owner with Father, it would have issued a pclicy and 
named both of them as insureds, and a~ks you whether the fact that the ownership 
was not sole and unconditional affects the Company's liability. How ought you advise· 
(INSUFANCE) It does not. If the misrepresentation is not material to the risk when 
a·ssumed it will not avoid the policy. Here the Company admits it was immaterial. To 
allow avoidance on that ground would also violate the spirit of the statute re-
quiring each automobile liability insurance policy to contain the omnibus clause 
which insures anyone driving the car with insured's permission. See 202 Va.579 on 
p.2126 of the Insurance Cases in these Notes • 
6~~~in Kerns, a business executive of Culpeper, Va., pur~h~sed in 1955 a $10,000 
policy of life insurance on his life and designed his estate as beneficiary. All 
premiums were, through the life of the policy, paid by him. Reserving the right to 
change the benef:i.ciary, he subsequently named his girl friend, Ruby Burton, the 
beneficiary under the poli~y. In 1961, Kerns borrowed from Farmers Bank the sum of 
$3,000 and assigned the policy, with o tlBr <.;olla-t;,eral, to secure the payment of the 
note executed to evidence t~w debt. Insurance Company was notified of the assign-
ment. In 1963, upon the dea-lih of Jolm Kerns, the Ir.,surance Company, at the bank's 
request, paid ~~3 .~~ooo to .Farmers Bahk on the debt and delive:ced to Ruby Burton a 
check for the balance of ~~7 ,000 , William Kerns, Adrdnistrator of the E3tate of John 
Kerns, instituted an action against Huby Bu:c·ton, claiming that she had no insurable 
interest in the life of John Kerns and should pay over to his estate the $'7 ,ooo. 
Ruby counterclaimed, setting forth that not only -vras she entitled to the $7,000, 
but that the estate owed her the ~$3-~'000 deducted from the poli(;y and paid on the 
note to Farmers Bank. Issue vras joined on these ttoJ'O claims. How ought the Court 
decide? 
(INSUfiANCE) The Court should deeide in f avor of Huby Burton on both matters. Every 
person has an insurable interest in his ot.vn life, and; if sui j uris, may make anyone 
the beneficiaryc Since John Kerns only pledged the policy as security he did not 
intend to divest; Ruby Burton of her rights. Hence shs: ia subrogated to the bank's 
rights against Kern's estate. Had Kerns redQemed the policy, as he intended, he 
would hmre had $3JIOOO less in his estate and ~p3,000 more in life insurance for the 
benefit of Ruby Burton. See 184 Va.259c 
r 
9.5 J5-ot bti.ng Thomas was issued a $10~000 life insurance policy by Southern Bell I,ife 
Insurance Company~ In his application he truthfully warranted that he was a profess-
ional actor and that he was not engaged in the employ of a railway company or an 
airplane co~panJ'• The policy provided that the company insured the life of Thomas 
so long as he was engaged solely in the business of a professional actor. The 
policy also provided~ . 
nThis policy shall be incontestable for any cause after J..t shall have been 
in force during the life of the insured for two yaars from ~ts date~" 
After the policy had been in effect for three years Thomas was k1lled whlle.he was 
employed as a brakeman by a railwny company. Tho~1as was employed by the ra1lw~y. 
company without the knowlf:ldge and consent of the 1nsurance c ompany. The benef~CJ.ary 
in the policy sued tho irlst::.ran~e com.p<:~.n;y to r ecover the fqce amount, of the pol1cy 
and the com~any defended, d8nyi ng liability.on the ~round that Thomas was employed 
as a brakeman by a railway company at.t~'2l tlme ~f h.ls_,_ death, and had been so employed 
for six months previously. Th.e bene.f.1c1ary ins1sted uhat the company could not deny 
liability in view of ths inconter;J::,able clause . 
Is the beneficiary entitled to recover? . , . , . 
4 ~INSUHANCE) No. The incontestable clause has ·~o do W.1.tn ~he J.nsurer s nght to avo _  d 
voidable contract of insurance. It has no-tih1ng to co lnth the ~overage which re-







8 ~~l11y Jenkins had acted as an a gent of Premier Fire Insur::mce Co. for many yea!'3 a 
On June 15,1964 he approached the President of Richmond Tobacco Corporation urging 
that there be obtained from p-.cemi er Fi~e Insurance Company a policy insuring the 
corporation's tobacco -v;arehoust:s a gainst loss by fi:ce. 'l'he President, who had been 
authorized t;o do so by the Board of Directors, signed on beha l f of the corporation 
an application for such fire ins urance in the f ac e amount o.f ~p200,000. A policy 
for that amount was promptly i ssued to the corpora t i on by Premier Fire Insurance Co. 
in exchange for the initial premium of ~~500 paid by the corporation. In August of 
1964, a large tobacco warehouse of R~.ehmond Tobac co Corpora t i on was destroyed by 
fire, and the corporation made demand upon Premier Fire Insurance Co. to compensate 
it for the loss. Premier Fir e Insurance Coo refused to do so. Shortly thereafter 
Riclli~ond Tobacco Corporation brought an a~tion on t he poli~y a gainst Premier Fire 
Insurance Company in the Law and Equit y Court . of t he City of Richmond, asking 
recovery of $140,000 as its loss. 
On the trial of the case., Premier Fire Insurance Co. proYed that for many years 
it had f ollowed a fixecl rule advis ing its agents tha t it v:ould not insure against 
loss by fire any building whi~h hc:>d be r-m damaged by ar.othe:r fire within twelve 
months prior to t he time of t he making of a pplication for fire insurance; that 
thi s rule was well known t o Billy Jenkins; t ha.t the des troyed vrarehous e had been 
damaged by fire on January 10 , 1964 , and a gain on Hay l lth i n the same year; that 
t he application f or insuranca which had bC'JE. n s i gned by Ri :::hmond Tobacco Corporation, 
after t he question 11Have t hese premises been damaged by fire wi·thin the past 
twelve months?" bore the answer 11 No1r; t hat the mis representation was material to 
the risk of Premier Fire I nsurance Co . ; t hat it woul d not have issued the policy to 
Richmond Tobacco Corpora·i;.ion had the t r ue fa(~ts been stated; and that it had tend-
ered back to Richmond Totacco Corpo~a.tion the $500 pr emium pa id. Richmond 
Tobacco Corporation proved that its Presid \?nt, at the time the application was 
solicited, told Jenkin3 uf the two ~rior fires; that J eru{ins informed the President 
that such prior losses •-re:re not materia l; that Jenkins had the President sign on 
behalf of Ricl:unond Tobacco Corp.Ji:ation a blank form of a pplicati on; that all 
answers to the questi ons on the f orm were filled in by Jenkins after he left the 
President's office; and that Richmond Tobacco Corporation a t no time prior to the 
fire loss was advised of the answers pl aced on the applicat ion form by Jenkins. 
The jury returned a verdj_ct fo:;:· Richmond Tobacco Corpor ation for $134,000. Premier 
Fi re Insurance Company then moved the court to set aside the verdict as contrary ·r..o 
t he law of the case. Should this motion have been sustai ned? 
vq./ll 
(INSUR.I\.NCE) No. The rule i n Virgini a is t~1at if the applicant makes true sta t. e.me tT:-s 
and t he agent puts down false ones and the applicant is i n no way to blame, notice 
to t he agent is notice to the pri n.::ipa l and the company who employs such a n a g<!nt 
:i.s estopped t o rE:ly ,on its o•m agent's wrong . See 168 Va. a t P • 645; also 198 Va . 
255 on p . 2l 21 of the Insurance Cases in these Notes. 
6 .~~hn W.r e h0.d fo r som8 time bee~1 rou C;lch:.g out D:w._; SmrJoth to "t e:J. ch 
r' i r:J. o. l a s son 11 fo r t ·-·-k i ng out J ohn ' s e; ir l fr i ond a nd J ohn co.rricd a pi stol 
for t h i s purp ) sc . Fi r.-:-t ll :.~ ~ · .T ohr:. cctuc;ht up ·lit h f;.~.w · ·· t --. l J ca l b.Jc r 
pa rl or, and without wa r ni ng , f ired o.. shot a t Dave . J ohn 's a im was not 
to o good, f or the shot only cre9.s ed Dave ' s hea d . Dave dove "lt J ohn and 
'J. s cuffle ensued . During t he scuff l e J ohn f ell to t he flo or, hitting 
his head upon t he ba r r a iling . As a dire ct r osult of this blow t o hi s 
head , J ohn di ed . At t he time of his dea t h , John ha d i n eff ect a policy 
of a ccident a l dG a t h i nsurance i n which t he insurance company ha d agre ed 
t o pay t he n~me d beneficia ry, J ohn 1 s mothe r, $5,000 , upon t he deat h of 
J ohn , if the deat h wer e "eff e ct ed so l el y t hr ough cxt er n::tl, viol ent, and 
a ccident a l means . 11 The i nsurance c or.1p ~1 ny r efu sed t o pay t ho beneficiary, 
on t he gr ound tha t J ohn t s dea t h had not been cau s ed by a ccident a l means 
within t he moani ng of the policy . The beneficia r y now come s t o you f or 
a dvice . 
How ought f OU t o advise her? 
(Insurance ) There was no a ccident her e , so t here ca n be no colle ction 
on the policy. Th e de cease d pr e c i pita t e d a fi ght and deat h c ould ha ve 
been r easonably fo r se eabl e . There i s no a ccident if deat h could r oason-
~bly be ant i cipa t ed fr om t h o a ctivity. See 202 Va . 758. 
/ 
I ./ Lj 
7.vStrict, a resident of Norfolk, Vao 1 let his seventeen-year-old son, Loafer, use 
the family automobile but on the condition that he was not to let anyone else drive 
it. Loafer faithfully premised to honor this command, but toward the end of a gay 
evening, he decided to let his friend, Sharpie, drive ·so that Loafer and his date 
could ride in the back seat. While driving the automobile, Sharpie negligently 
struck and injured Faultless, who thereafter sued Sharpie for damages for persor.al 
injury. 
Strict had a liability insurnace policy issue:! in Norfolk, Va., on his automobile 
which provided insurance protection ·only when the driver hC?.d the permission or con-
sent of the named insured to operate the automobile, and the company denied 
liability under the policy and refused to defend the action against Sharpie. After 
Faultless recovered a judgment against him, Sharpie sued the insurance Company for 
the amount of the judgmentc Is the company liable? 
(INSURANCE) The Co~pany is liable. V#38ol-38l(a) as amended in 1962 expressly pro-
vides that consent may be given by the owner or cu3todian. The son was a custodian 
and gave his consent. 
Note: Before the amendment the law was otherwise where the owner told the party to 
whom he entrusted the car not to let anyone else drive.. It is arguable that the 
above statute in so far as it relates to custodians is applicable only to a non-
owned automobile(as l-Jhere X buys a stolen C;ar and takes out liability insuranee). 
A recent federal cas~, 238 F .Suppa lhl(l965.) allowed a recovery with no mention of 
the above statute although the case arose after the effecti'lre date of the 1962 
amendm~nta 
J~!ones, a special agent of the Allright Life Insurance Co., solicited Strong to 
take out a policy of life insurance in that company. Jones had no authority to do 
anything except solicit applications and collect and remit to the Company the first 
premium. Pursuant to the solicitation Strong signed an application for a policy of $5 1000. The material parts of the application were: 0 No statements or promises made 
by the person soliciting this insurance shall be binding on the Company, and the • 
Company shall incur no liability on account of this application until a policy is 
issued and delivered to the applicant during his lifetime, he then being in good 
health and having then paid the first premium.n 
Jones arranged for a medical examination of Strong and seeing him after the exam-
ination had been made said to him: nyou passed the medical all right. I have sent 
your application ih to the Company. Now pay me the premium and you will be insured". 
Strong then paid Jones the first premium. The medical report was not satisfactory 
and the Company delayed several week in acting on the application while it was 
making further investigation. Before the investigation was completed, Strong was 
killed. The Company tendered the return of the premium and denied liability. 
You are consulted as to the right of the beneficiary to recover. How ought you 
to advise? 
(INSURANCE) Beneficiary may not recover, the company's application being a proposal 
and no acceptance except as the conditions of its statement were to be complied with 4 
At least as to its liability on the contract, the company was under no duty to act 
promptly, although some few cases throughout the nation have held that it might 
constitute tort liability if hhe delay was negligent because unreasonable, and the 
applicant was misled. 198 va~670. ' 
• 
• 
9;r~~ Smith held a policy of public liability automobile insurance issued by 
Imperial Insurance Company. The policy provided for coverage up to $15,000 for in• 
juries caused any one person through the negligence of Smith in the operation of his 
automobile& On Sept. 14, 1966, Smith carelessly drove through a red light and 
struck John Rolfe, a young business man who was properly walking across the inter-
section. As a result of the accident, Rolfe was severely injured and permanently 
crippled. Smith promptly gave proper notice of the accident to Imperial Insurance 
Company and asked that they defend any claim made against him, as provided for 
by the policy. In February of 1967, Rolfe brought an action against Smith in the 
Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond seeking damages of $75,000. After the 
action was brought, Smith called upon Rolfe and persuaded him to compromise the 
action by accepting $6,000, in full settlement. Smith at once notified the Insurance 
Company of Rolfe's willingness to settle at that figure and recommended that the 
Company make the necessary payment. The Insurance Company, which under the terms of 
the policy, had the sole right to determine the compromise of claims, advised Smith 
that they thought the settlement figure was too high and rejected it, and said they 
would let the litigation continue and defend the case on behalf of Smith. The case 
was tried without error on May 15, 1967, and the jury returned a verdict against 
Smith and for Rolfe awarding the latter damages ~f $54,000. On May 22nd, Imperial 
734. 
Insurance Company paid Rolfe $151 000, Smith paid him the remaining $39,0001 and the judgment was marked nsatisfied". Smith has now brought an action against Imperial 
Insurance Company to recover damages for $39,000, and his motion for judgment has 
alleged all the foregoing facts, and has charged that the Company did not act in 
good faith when it refused to compromise the case for only ~6,000. Imperial Insurance 
Company has demurred to the motion for judgment. Should the demurrer be sustained? 
(INSURANCE) No. The motion for judgment alleged all the facts sufficient to consti-
tute a cause of action and therefore the demurrer will not li~~. The Supreme Court 
of Appeals, in 206 Va.749(1966), recognized that where an insured is sued on a 
liability insurance policy by an injured party and an offer to compromise the claim 
within the limits of the coverage of the policy is rejected by the insurer, who is 
defending the insured, and a verdict is returned well in excess of the policy 
coverage against the insured, the insured has a cause of action against the insurer 
for the excess amount which he must satisfy, if the insurer acted in what amounts to 
bad faith in rejecting the offer of compromise. The Court stated the "the obligatior. 
a ssumed by the insurer with respect to settlement is to exercise good f~~ in 
dealing with offers of compromise, having both its own and the insured's interests 
in mind. Thus stated, the Court adopted the Bad Faith Rule in relation to the 
liability of the insurer t~ his insured. Smith, in his motion for judgment, stated 
all the facts and then alleged that the insurer did not act in good faith in reject-
ing the offer of compromise. Thus, Smith has stated a cause of action and the 
demurrer should be overruled. 
'? a.D~awkeyo purchased and carried a life insurance policy issued by Southern Life 
Insurance Co. The policy provided for the payment to HawkeyeJs sister as benefici-
ary, an amount indicated in a schedule of sliding payments ranging upward from 
five hundred dollars for death of the insgred at age of twenty-one to five thousand 
dollars for death at fifty years of age, thereafter gradually decreasing in amount 
for added age. The policy contained this languages 
"In each case the amount of benefits is to be determined by the attained 
age at the time of death. 11 
The policy contained this further provision: 
"Should the insured die or death be caused directly or indirectly from 
heart disease, liver, bladder or kidney trouble, contracted within three 
years from the date of this policy, the company will pay one-fifth of 
the amount otherwise payable under the terms of this policy." 
The insured died from heart disease which had its inception during the third year 
from the date the policy was issued. The beneficiary made claim for three thousand 
dollars, the amount named in the policy at the attained age of the insured at the 
time of his death. The company refused payment in that amount, and offered to pay 
the sum of six hundred dollars, being one-fifth of the amount otherwise payable ~ 
The beneficiary refused to accept that amount and sued the company to recover three 
thousand dollars, contending that the company could not contest its obligation to 
pay according to the schedule contained in the policyo In support of this conten-
tion the beneficiary relied upon the provision of the Virginia statute which pro-
vides that a policy of life insurance shall be incontestable "for any cause after 
it shall have been in force during the lifetime of the insured for two years from 
its date .. " 
· -
Is the contention of the beneficiary sound, and may she recover the sum of 
three thousand dollars? 
(INSURANCE) The beneficiary may not . recover the sum of three thousand dollars. The 
incontestable statute applies when the validity of an insurance policy is contested; 
it does not apply to the contract provisions of the policy which exclude certain 
risks. Here the contest relate:a. to the: coverage of the policy, and not to its 
validity, and henc e the incontestable statute has no application. 170 Va?479, 
36.1-441. 
7.~lmer Vance purchased a life insurance policy from the Beneficial Life Insurance 
Company, naming as the beneficiary therein his daughter, Sally Vanc e. He also 
purchased a fire insurance policy on his home from the Fire and Casualty Insurance 
Company. Sally Vance, for consideration, assigned her interest in the life insurance 
policy to Happy Creek, who was in no way related to Sally and her father. Also, 
Homer Vance for consideration, assigned his fire insurance policy to Ralph Surry, 
who had no lnterest in the property. Both assignments were made without the know-
ledge and consent of the insurance companies. Neither policy contained a provis~on 
respecting assignability. A year after the assignment of the fire insuranc~ pol1cy, 
and while Homer Vance was still living, his house was destroyed by fire. S1x days 
after the house burned Homer Vance died. . (a) Ralph Surry consults you and inquires whether he may enforce collectJ.on 
of the fire insurance from Fire and Casualty Insurance Company. 
(8) Happy Creek consults you and inquires whether he may enforce payment 
of t~~)life insurance policy assigned to him. What would you ~dvise? 
(INSURANCE) Surry may not enforce collection of the fire insurance, s1nce he had 
no interest in the house at the time of loss. Furthermore, the general rule as to 
fire insurance policies is that since they are regarded as personal contracts de-
pending upon the confidence reposed by the insurers in the ~wners of property, they 
are not assignable before loss without the consent of the 1nsurer. 29 Am Jur 
1/652' pp. 929' 930. . (b) Happy Creek may enforce payment of the life insurance pol1cy. ~n the absence of 
contrary provision in the policy, an assignment may be made of a l1fe insurance 
policy without regard to whether the assignee has an insurable interest in the life 
insured or not, and the assignee may recov8r upon it whatever the insured might 
have recovered but for such assignment. 38.1-442. 
• 
• 
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